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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept., JCS reviews completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

*Laos: Souvanna Phouma has agreed to stay on as premier under terms laid down by the military.

The announcement of Souvanna's decision was made following a cabinet meeting this morning. Yesterday, coup leaders and rightist generals had met in Vientiane to work out a program regarding the future of the coalition government.

Coup leader General Kouprasith, at the conclusion of yesterday's sessions, indicated that Souvanna, while continuing to head the government of national union, would be expected to rework and expand it "in conformity with the present state of affairs." Kouprasith hinted that the newly formed Committee for National Defense--reportedly to be comprised of Lao Army generals--would play a major role in determining future policy. The committee, he announced, would recommend individuals for inclusion in the government as well as "follow and oversee the execution of governmental tasks."

The Pathet Lao, who have vigorously protested the coup and demanded a return to pre-coup conditions, can be expected to oppose strongly any shifting of the coalition balance in favor of the rightists. Kong Le, however, who also has been opposed to the coup, is likely to go along with Souvanna's decision.

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Zanzibar: Intensive maneuvering is following the announcement of a Tanganyika-Zanzibar union.

Tanganyikan leaders apparently have convinced President Karume and Vice President Hanga that union with Tanganyika is the only way to prevent Foreign Minister Babu's pro-Chinese Arabs from gaining complete control of Zanzibar. Agreement in principle for the union was announced yesterday in Dar-es-Salaam after President Nyerere made a quick trip to Zanzibar to get Karume's final approval.

*Nyerere and Defense Minister Kambona, who has long believed that Tanganyika should absorb the islands, have become increasingly alarmed over developments in Zanzibar and over the possibility that the Communists--particularly Chinese--may have longer range designs on Tanganyika.

It is unlikely that the union can be accomplished before Babu's return from Pakistan. Most of the details are still to be worked out and the final agreement must be ratified by the Revolutionary Council, where some members do not want to surrender Zanzibar's sovereignty to Tanganyika. Babu, who has opposed federation with mainland countries, may yet persuade Karume to reverse his decision.

[Karume and Hanga reportedly have agreed to transfer Babu and his two principal lieutenants to innocuous posts but they do not want to move precipitously. The Tanganyikans--sensitive to a possible neo-imperialist image--have agreed with the two Zanzibari leaders to go slow on removing Babu.]

[Tanganyikan police on Zanzibar have been alerted and reinforcements flown in. Together with African]

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Elements of the fledgling Zanzibar Army loyal to Karume, they may be able to block any counteraction by Babu's followers.

Babu's security force of some 150 men contains the best armed, best trained, and best disciplined Zanzibaris. Its Cuban-trained leaders are loyal to Babu, but the allegiance of some of its newly trained Africans is unknown.

The Tanganyikan leaders are concerned about Moscow's reaction. Yesterday when informed by Kambona of the union agreement, the Soviet chargé in Dar-es-Salaam said little but was obviously displeased. Reportedly, he referred obliquely to Tanganyika's interference in another nation's internal affairs and reminded Kambona that the Communist countries are giving considerable aid to Zanzibar.

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South Vietnam: Viet Cong military activity, which has been rising steadily since late February, continues at a high rate.

Aggressive guerrilla action is particularly evident in the Mekong Delta region. Following last week's five-day battle in Chuong Thien Province, the Viet Cong launched a series of coordinated actions against government outposts along the Mekong River.

The Viet Cong have also stepped up harassment of river and road traffic around Saigon. *On 22 and 23 April, strong Viet Cong forces ambushed government troops in Han Nghia Province, west of Saigon. The ambushes resulted in sizable losses, including one American killed and three wounded in yesterday's action.

The government's reaction to major Viet Cong attacks has been swift but costly. More than 1,000 government casualties were reported last week--the highest weekly total recorded in the past three years. By comparison, the average weekly casualty rate was approximately 250 in 1962 and 390 in 1963.

The Viet Cong, too, have suffered heavy losses--660 killed and captured last week. The Viet Cong, however, continue to capture three weapons for every one lost, the ratio that has prevailed this year.

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*British Guiana: Violence stemming from the prolonged sugar workers' strike is increasing and may eventually require the intervention of British troops.

The two-and-a-half-month-old strike--instigated by a pro-Jagan union--was political from the outset, and is now taking on an increasingly racial complexion. There were several serious incidents this week between East Indians and Negroes in the west coast Demerara region despite the pleas of two Jagan ministers against recourse to violence.

The governor has reportedly called up the 600-man volunteer force for guard duties to free the police for use in the areas where racial clashes are occurring.

The police believe that some of the more serious incidents are the work of a terrorist group advised by six to eight Cuban-trained youths. The US consul accordingly fears that violence may persist during the election campaign later this year.

25X1 In any event, there have been numerous reports [redacted] that the Jagan youth organization is making preparations for a campaign of violence in the near future.

[redacted]

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UK-MLF: [London is concerned that agreement may be reached on a charter for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) before Britain is in a position to sign.]

[At a meeting with US Ambassador Finletter on 21 April, UK Permanent Representative to NATO Shuckburgh said it would be "most unfortunate" if the British were not in the MLF at the outset.]

[He said Foreign Secretary Butler wants to create a situation which would permit British adherence regardless of which party is in power in the UK. The Labor Party has been cool to the MLF.]

[Shuckburgh said he believes that study by the MLF working group of several new proposals he has recently introduced would help mollify the opposition to the MLF among the British military services.]

[Several of the participants in the MLF talks seem to suspect, however, that the UK's purpose in advancing these proposals is to delay the need for any British commitment as long as possible.]

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Gabon: Deep-seated dissatisfaction with President Mba's regime remains widespread.

Although recent elections gave Mba's supporters 31 of the 47 seats in the National Assembly, even the officially announced returns conceded 45 percent of the popular vote to opposition candidates. Considerable government pressure was necessary to insure the Mba slate's victory.

Opposition deputies in the new assembly, which convenes on 27 April, may work for the re-establishment of a parliamentary government in which Mba's powers would be reduced. They might be joined in this action by some of the deputies elected on pro-Mba slates.

The French have stood firmly behind Mba although, with the elections over, they may urge him to be conciliatory. Any compromise between Mba and his principal opponents, all of whom are imprisoned, still seems remote. Continued frustration of the opposition's demands could well lead to violence.

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Congo: The Congo Army--already heavily committed against the Kwilu rebellion--may become increasingly hard pressed by disorders elsewhere.

Tribal violence broke out last week in the Kivu area of the eastern Congo and has not completely subsided. There are unconfirmed reports of movement of a band of dissident youths northwest of Stanleyville.

Such disturbances could provide opportunities for the exile "Committee of National Liberation" (CNL) based in Brazzaville, which evidently has increased its activity recently. In the past two weeks, two CNL groups armed with grenades have been arrested, one near Coquilhatville, the other in Lac Leopold II Province.]

[Two other CNL groups have been arrested in the capital itself during the past month. A member of one of these groups carried documents outlining a plot to assassinate leading Congolese Government officials.]

The CNL has proved ineffective in the past and its leadership is still badly fragmented, but it could well prove a serious threat. The CNL leaders are almost certainly in contact with the Chinese Communists in both Brazzaville and Burundi. The Chinese chargé in Burundi recently expressed disillusionment with CNL representatives, but he has given them small amounts of money in the past.

The rebellion in Kwilu meanwhile continues to smoulder. Four Congo Army battalions are tied down there. The US ambassador fears this rebellion may continue almost indefinitely.

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NOTE

East Germany - Hungary: Ulbricht reportedly will begin his first official visit to Hungary on 26 April, apparently in another move to prevent further political isolation. East Germany is concerned because several of the East European countries, including Hungary, have moved toward closer relations with the West, especially West Germany. Ulbricht went to Poland last fall seeking to improve relations between the two countries, which had been deteriorating, but he failed.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

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The Director of the Budget

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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